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Preharvest Soybean Marketing Strategies
Roger Wilson and David J. Drozd, Graduate Students;
George Pfeiffer, Associate Professor and Jim Kendrick, Professor Emeritus, Agricultural Economics

This NebGuide provides strategies for using the
futures market to obtain higher prices for soybeans.

Soybean producers who decide to use the futures market
to price their crop are immediately faced with a number of
decisions. Should a futures contract be used as a hedge to
“lock in” a price, or should an options contract be used to
establish a floor price? When should the position be established? Which futures contract month is most appropriate?
The many decisions facing those using the futures market
may be a reason some have decided not to use it at all.
The University of Nebraska completed a study analyzing
various preharvest marketing strategies from 1988 to 1997.
The study used daily futures and options prices and weekly
decisions to identify basic strategies that consistently result
in higher prices received than simply selling soybeans at
harvest. The study calculated prices obtained by using hedges,

put options, and “fences”, a more complex strategy using put
and call options. It compared the November and January
contracts and various entry and exit strategies. It concludes
that preharvest marketing strategies effectively increase the
net soybean price received by producers.1
Simple Calendar Hedges
A calendar hedge establishes positions at times during
the year when prices are typically high. Figure 1 shows that
prices tend to peak twice during the growing season. The first
peak is early in May and the second is toward the end of June.
Placing hedges at these times to “lock in” high prices is
logical.
A hedge established the third week of June using the
November contract and liquidated on October 15 when the
soybeans were sold at harvest resulted in the best net price
1

Additional analysis of the study’s results can be viewed at http://
www.ag.uiuc.edu/~ne-qssb/strategies/index.htm
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Figure 1. Seasonal soybean price trends.
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received of any strategy analyzed in this study. It had a 10year average net price of $6.37, a 48 cent per bushel gain over
the 10-year average of $5.89 received from an October 15
cash sale at harvest, which was this study’s base for comparisons. It was a consistently profitable strategy in that gains
were made on the futures hedge in eight out of the 10 years
between 1988 and 1997. The two losses were in the amounts
of 35 and 42 cents.
A hedge set the first week in May also had good results.
Its average net price received was $6.25, a 36 cent gain over
the October 15 harvest sale. This strategy took losses in three
of the 10 years, ranging from 16 cents to one dollar.
The reason the returns from hedging in June were higher
than hedging in May was that the price for soybeans in 1988
rose dramatically between May and June. This sudden price
increase in that one year resulted in a large profit for the 1988
June hedging strategy while causing a large loss for the 1988
May hedging strategy. When the 1988 prices are excluded
from the study, gains from hedging in May increase from 36
to 51 cents per bushel while the June hedging strategies
decrease from 48 to 34 cents per bushel. The strategies using
the January contract were similarly impacted by the sudden
surge in soybean prices in 1988.
Moving Averages
Moving averages are a tool some use to decide when to
establish a hedge. For example, a chart with nine and 18-day
moving averages is shown on the CBOT web site. (http://
www.cbot.com/mplex/vendors/mri/bots.htm)
When futures prices are trending higher, the short-term
average is higher than the long-term average. As the price
trend changes and goes down, the short-term average price
will change more rapidly and will “cross” the long-term
average from above. This cross is the signal to place a hedge.
This study included four strategies that used moving
averages. None were as effective as the calendar hedges.
Three of these strategies began April 15 and used moving
averages of 18 and 45 days, nine and 45 days and four and
nine days. The last moving average strategy began June 10
and used four and nine-day averages. If no triggers were
encountered during this period of time, a hedge was not
placed. All moving average strategies used the November
contract.
The nine and 45-day and both four and nine-day averages resulted in profits ranging from 33 to 36 cents per bushel.
These profits were lower than those obtained using the best
calendar hedges. In addition, the simplicity in setting calendar hedges makes them preferred by most producers. The
hedge using the 18 and 45-day averages showed a 7 cents per
bushel gain which is substantially less successful than the
other strategies.
The Frost Scare
The final method for determining when to set a hedge
used a percent increase in price as a “trigger” and was used
to establish a hedge in September. The purpose of this
strategy is to take advantage of a “frost scare” that occurs on
a regular basis. This late season hedging opportunity allows
producers to wait until they know the size of their soybean
crop before using the futures market to establish prices.
The study showed that hedging after prices rose 2.5
percent from the September 1 price was an effective strategy

but did not result in a hedge being set every year. This signal
to hedge occurred in six out of 10 years, resulting in an
average increase in price of 42 cents per bushel for these six
years. When averaged over the entire 10-year time frame, the
strategy’s average net price received was $6.14, a 25 cent gain
over the October 15 cash sale.
Although this study tried to detect frost scares by using
this percent increase in price technique, most producers may
be able to simply place hedges based on media coverage of
weather concerns.
The November Versus the January Contract
The study concludes that soybeans can be hedged successfully both the first week in May and the third week in June
using either the November or January contracts. Results
using the November contracts were slightly superior to those
using the January contracts. Most of this difference is due to
opportunity costs, storage costs at one cent per bushel per
month, and handling costs of 7 cents per bushel that were
assessed on the soybeans held for later sale.
November contracts were liquidated the Thursday nearest October 15, which the study had established as the harvest
cash sale date. January contract hedges were either liquidated
the Thursday nearest December 15 or the first Thursday after
January 2 when the cash soybeans were sold. Cash soybeans
were sold and hedges were liquidated on the same day.
The differences in average prices between the two contract months can be explained by costs associated with storing
soybeans. Thus, the best strategy depends on an individual
producer’s storage situation. If a producer routinely puts the
soybeans into on-farm storage at harvest, the handling costs
do not need to be considered, making the January contract
hedges liquidated around December 15 superior.
The advantage of using the November contract is that it
has higher trading volume than the January contract. On the
other hand, some soybean producers may elect to use the
January contract because it provides them with protection on
late harvested beans or for those beans sold after January 1 for
tax purposes. These considerations may be more important
than the differences in price received between these contract
months.
Put Options
Although put options may be effective in marketing
soybeans, the results of put strategies included in this study
were disappointing. It found that put options were a less
effective soybean-pricing tool than futures hedges. The high
cost (premium) to purchase put options was the major reason
why they did not perform as favorably as futures hedges. Puts
have advantages over hedging such as eliminating margin
calls and allowing producers to take advantage of rising
prices.
The techniques used for analyzing hedges also were
applied to put options. The put option, however, has some
differences that must be taken into consideration. First,
option contracts mature in the month prior to futures contract
expiration. Strategies compared holding options to expiration versus liquidating them approximately six weeks before
expiration to recapture time value, but only negligible differences were seen in the overall prices received.
Another consideration is that various strike prices can be
purchased with option contracts. This study included the

strike price nearest the futures price called the “at-themoney” strike price, two strike prices above the futures price
called “in-the-money” options, and two strike prices below
futures called “out-of-the-money” options. “In-the-money”
puts are more expensive because they protect a higher price
level. “Out-of-the-money” puts are popular as they reduce the
capital needed to participate in the market.
The best put option strategy resulted in an average price
of $6.04, a 15 cent gain over the harvest sale. This strategy
bought a one strike “in-the-money” put in late June on the
November contract for an average of 59 cents. The option was
held until expiration and had four years of losses ranging
from 15 to 66 cents. Rising prices late in the fall in 1995 and
1997 caused the options to expire without intrinsic value, so
the entire option premium was lost, hurting the strategy’s
average gain.
General guidelines for using put options gleaned from
this and other studies are:
• Purchase put options during the historical high price
times, which are early in May and late June.
• “In-the-money” put options, although initially more
expensive, consistently result in larger option profits
than “out-of-the-money” options.
• November put options can be liquidated about six
weeks prior to expiration if they have no intrinsic value
to regain a portion of the option’s time value. However,
in most years, futures prices trend downward into the
harvest time frame so liquidating the put option makes
one prone to downside price risk.
• Moving average techniques were deemed ineffective
in determining when to purchase puts.
• January put option contracts have low volume but can
provide price protection for a longer portion of the fall
time frame.
Call Option Strategies
Preharvest call strategies have two main purposes: 1)
selling a call to regain a portion of the premium (cost) of
buying a put option (Fences) and 2) buying a call to provide
protection against major price rises when a hedge was
previously established (Synthetic puts).
Fences
Fence strategies are most advantageous if implemented
when calls are sold for the highest possible price. Proceeds
from selling the call reduce the net premium paid for the put.
Calls typically have their highest value as futures prices rise
early in the crop year. The research shows fences are best
established as futures prices peak in early May and late June.
Analyzing a fence established the first week of May
resulted in an average net price received of $6.17, a 28 cent
profit over the October 15 cash sale of $5.89. The largest
profit was $1.36 and this strategy took a loss four years out of
10 ranging from 10 to 44 cents. The nearest “out-of-themoney” put was purchased for an average of 31 cents.
Analysis of selling call strikes 50, 75 and 100 cents over the
put strike showed that the 50 cent spread was the most
profitable but only by a small amount. The 50 cent higher call
was sold for an average of 29 cents, making the average net
premium paid only 2 cents. This strategy did not time the
major price rises in 1988 and 1995 correctly, hurting its
average.

The same 50 cent fence strategy established the third
week in June had a slightly higher put premium of 33 cents.
The 50 cent higher call is now sold for an average of 30 cents,
making the average net premium paid 3 cents. This strategy
had losses three years out of 10 ranging from 7 to 21 cents.
The highest profit was $1.95 and overall the strategy averaged a 39 cent profit. This strategy tied for the second-highest
overall results—only the third week in June hedge strategy
performed better at a 48 cent profit.
A “leg-on” fence allows producers to take some price
protection early in the growing season and still sell the call
when it is likely to have its highest value. Thus, in the first
week of May, the first “out-of-the-money” put is purchased
for 31 cents. Based on the seasonal trend for futures prices to
peak the third week in June, a call was sold then for an average
of 40 cents. The net premium of 9 cents is not paid but
received. This strategy took losses in two years out of 10 in
the amount of 33 and 34 cents. The highest profit was $1.25
and the average profit was 39 cents. This strategy tied for the
second-highest overall results—only the third week in June
hedge strategy performed better at a 48 cent profit. In two
years the put option expired with no intrinsic value, but a
profit was still gained based on the net premium received.
The drawback of a fence is that it limits the gains of a
futures price rise to the strike price of the call option sold.
Once the call has intrinsic value, the seller is required to
maintain equity in the account. To minimize the odds of
having to add margin, a fence should be established so that
there is at least a 50 cent spread (i.e. 6.50 put strike and 7.00
call strike) to allow for price fluctuations and the call should
be sold when futures are not likely to rise significantly.
Synthetic puts
Although a synthetic put is not as profitable as a hedge,
it does provide emotional and financial stress relief while
maintaining the hedge for downside price protection.
Hedges “lock in” prices. The hedge protects against
futures price declines and money will be made on the cash
market if futures rise. However, hedgers are faced with
margin calls as futures prices rise.
Margin calls may tempt producers to liquidate hedges in
uptrending markets. However, if hedges are removed, a
market decline creates a “double negative”. First, the hedge
has been closed at a loss. Second, the hedge will likely be
reestablished at a lower price.
Owning a call option can offset hedge margin calls.
Using this “synthetic put” still provides downside risk protection but limits the adverse aspects of rising futures prices.
The strategy bought a call if futures rose 50 cents above
the May hedge price. This occurred four years out of 10 and
ranged between May 16 and July 17. An “at-the-money” call
was purchased for an average of 46 cents. All four years the
option took a loss when held to expiration and the amount
averaged 42 cents. Only once did the option expire with
intrinsic value and it only partially offset the option premium.
The hedge profit allowed the net price to be $6.08, a 19 cent
gain over the October 15 cash sale. The problem with this
strategy was that futures tended to decline into the harvest
time frame, making the call worthless.
To minimize this problem, a strategy was developed to
sell the call approximately 6-7 weeks before its expiration.
After early September, the likelihood of a major rally is small.
This helped retain the option’s time value and did a better job

of capturing intrinsic value. The four years of significant
price rise using this strategy have an average option loss of
only 11 cents, perhaps an acceptable amount if margin calls
are reduced. Overall, the strategy averaged a net price of
$6.21, a 32 cent profit over the basic mid-October sale.
Strategies buying calls after 75 cent and $1 rises were
also analyzed. The 75 cent strategy triggered three times and
the $1 rise only happened twice. The same patterns occurred
as holding until expiration had serious option losses while
selling the call in early September captured more of the
option’s time and intrinsic value.
Fundamentally, synthetic puts are an insurance policy
against major price rises. Having to pay an average of 46 cents
upfront and ultimately taking an 11 cent loss shows that
insurance is not cheap.
Hedgers must analyze their financial situation, risk
tolerance, and current market outlook for price advances
when determining if synthetic puts should be used.
Putting It All Together
The research shows that high prices tend to occur
seasonally in early May, late June, and early to mid September. Strategies were developed and analyzed based on these
seasonal price trends.
Several preharvest strategies (hedges, fences) showed
significant gains over an October 15 cash sale. However, the
gains will only be realized on the amount of bushels marketed
in that manner.
It is unlikely that a producer would price 100 percent of
their crop during early May or late June. Yet, marketing only
5 to 10 percent in this time frame would not be extremely
beneficial either. So how does one develop a low-risk marketing program that maximizes the net price received?
The authors’ discussions led to the development of a
conservative seasonal marketing program. This seasonal
marketing program is a feasible way for producers to handle
the emotional stress of dealing with the markets while
obtaining substantial price improvements.
Specifically, as corn planting finishes and the number of
bean acres is determined in May, 20 percent of the expected
crop could be marketed based on an average yield estimate.
As time progresses, based on growing conditions,
adjustments to expected production may need to be made.

A total of 60 percent of adjusted production could be priced
by late June. This would allow most of the crop to be priced
during traditional high price periods but leave room to make
further sales if rallies continue.
A September frost scare presents another marketing
opportunity. If the markets rally, up to 75 percent of adjusted
expected production could be marketed. (an additional 15
percent) The frost scare strategy used a trigger of selling if
futures rose 2.5 percent above the September 1 price. If a sell
signal is not triggered, the crop remains 60 percent priced.
The remaining portion of the crop is unpriced. This
insures the crop will not be overhedged and allows for
production shortfalls.
Analyzing this percentage seasonal marketing strategy,
the hedge the first week in May profited 36 cents. The hedge
the third week in June gained 48 cents and the September
hedge made an average of 41 cents on the six years it triggered
or 25 cents if averaged over all ten years. Based on marketing
20 percent, an additional 40 percent and another 15 percent
of production during these times, a total of 30 cents is gained
on every bushel produced. This price improvement is less
than the best strategy’s 48 cent gain. However, the full 48
cents will only be obtained if 100 percent of production is
hedged in late June. Hedging 100 percent leaves the risk of a
production shortfall and substantial margin calls.
The strategy described reduces price risk by pricing only
portions of the expected crop on the seasonal rallies. However, it is aggressive enough to significantly improve net
price received. The advantage of this system is that a portion
of the crop is priced in May, protecting prices if futures
steadily decline throughout the growing season like in 1989
and 1992. In addition, producers benefit by capturing summertime rallies in years like 1988 and 1994 by pricing
additional amounts later in the growing season. Seasonal
marketing obtains a maximized overall price.
Percent seasonal marketing is a feasible program for
most producers to implement. It was designed to help take the
risk and stress out of marketing. If there is a concern over
margin calls that accompany a hedging strategy, put or
synthetic put strategies could be used. However, with the
reduced risk of margin calls come reduced returns. Whatever
the risk tolerance and strategy chosen, this research shows
that producers taking preharvest price protection will be
rewarded.

Comparison of Strategies
Strategy

Net
Price

Largest
Loss

Years of
Loss

October 15 Cash Sale
Hedge first week in May, Liquidate October 15
Hedge third week in June, Liquidate October 15
Buy at-the-money put first week in May, Hold to expire
Buy first in-the-money put third week in June, Hold to expire
Establish fence with 50 cent spread third week in June
Calendar fence buying put first week of May, Sell call in June
Hedge on Frost Scare if futures rise 2.5% over Sept. 1 price

$5.89
$6.25
$6.37
$5.97
$6.04
$6.28
$6.28
$6.14

N/A
$1.00
$0.42
$0.52
$0.66
$0.21
$0.34
No Losses

N/A
3
2
4
4
3
2
0
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